Scott Cavanaugh (President)…

Scott Cavanaugh (President)

Tire Haulers of Ontario Association / All Star Transportation and Tire Recycling Inc.

Subject: Feedback on Proposed Amendments to the Tires Regulation (O. Reg. 225/18) and Related EPR Regulations

The proposed amendments do not resolve the systemic failures that haulers experience every single day in Ontario’s tire recycling system. Small and independent haulers receive constant calls from their collectors requesting pickup, yet PROs—particularly eTracks—have a long and well‑documented history of refusing, delaying, or selectively servicing these same sites. The new “call‑in” requirement will not change this behaviour. PROs have never honoured universal pickup obligations, and nothing in the proposed amendments creates an enforceable mechanism that would compel them to do so.

The 50‑tire threshold is also disconnected from real‑world operations. Many independent shops, garages, and even major dealerships do not have the physical space to store 50 tires. This rule will leave thousands of generators without service, and haulers will continue to be blamed for PRO‑created failures. The regulation must reflect the realities of the industry, not theoretical scenarios that do not exist on the ground.

The amendments also fail to address the root cause of suppressed service levels: the 65% producer recovery target. As long as producers are only required to meet 65%, PROs will continue to suppress hauler quotas, avoid rural and low‑volume generators, and leave haulers to absorb the operational and reputational damage when collectors cannot get timely service. This is the structural flaw that drives every other problem in the system, and the proposed amendments do nothing to correct it.

In addition, the amendments do not address the lack of meaningful RPRA oversight. RPRA currently has minimal enforcement tools and no effective regulatory mechanisms to govern PRO behaviour. The Authority has no practical ability to compel PROs to meet service obligations, correct anti‑competitive practices, or address repeated non‑compliance. This regulatory vacuum has allowed PROs—especially eTracks—to operate without accountability, and the proposed amendments do nothing to strengthen RPRA’s authority, enforcement powers, or independence. Without real oversight, no regulatory change will be effective.

The proposal also fails to address the illegal entry and mounting of unregulated imported tires, particularly low‑cost Chinese tires flooding the market. These tires enter the system without proper fees, without oversight, and without any contribution to end‑of‑life management. This is a major gap in the current framework, and the proposed amendments do not introduce a single mechanism to address it.

A meaningful solution requires moving beyond the PRO‑controlled model entirely. The Stewardship and Recycling Accountability Act, submitted with this response, establishes a government‑managed stewardship framework that ring‑fences Environmental Handling Fees, protects small haulers, creates transparent public processing capacity, and restores accountability through direct provincial oversight. This draft legislation was developed with industry stakeholders, has an accompanying petition with MPP Clancy (with signatures available upon request due to Ontario’s strict requirements), and is awaiting introduction by another MPP. It represents a real, workable solution—unlike the current proposal, which is not even a band‑aid and will not work.

Final Note:
These amendments also fail to address the anti‑competition concerns and industry dominance that have distorted Ontario’s tire recycling system. According to the November 14, 2025 leadership announcement, the Tire and Rubber Association of Canada (TRAC) is the sole member of eTracks and holds full governance authority over the PRO. TRAC appoints and removes the eTracks board, controls executive leadership, and represents the major tire manufacturers operating in Canada. This means eTracks is not governed by producers individually, nor by RPRA, but by a private industry association acting collectively on behalf of the largest tire companies.

This structure has resulted in eTracks controlling 70% or more of Ontario’s producers, giving it dominant market power and the ability to dictate service levels, pricing, and access. No regulatory framework can function properly when a private industry association with this level of concentration governs the PRO responsible for allocating collection obligations, processing volumes, and financial responsibilities. The proposed amendments do nothing to address this structural conflict, leaving the industry vulnerable to continued market distortion, anti‑competitive behaviour, and unfair treatment of small haulers.

Is this a conflict of interest?
Yes — it creates a structural conflict of interest under the RRCEA (Ontario), Canadian competition law principles, and standard governance norms for Producer Responsibility Organizations (PROs).

Under the Competition Act, this governance structure raises clear red flags because a producer‑controlled PRO can:

restrict market access

set prices indirectly

control supply (collection, hauling, processing)

disadvantage independent haulers or processors

A PRO controlled by a producer association is inherently capable of doing all of these.

This is precisely why British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec all prohibit producer associations from directly controlling stewardship agencies. Ontario is now the outlier — and the proposed amendments do nothing to correct this.

Ontario needs a stewardship system that is fair, transparent, enforceable, and grounded in operational reality. The proposed amendments do not meet that standard. The province must move toward a government‑managed model that eliminates PRO‑driven conflicts of interest, protects small haulers, ensures universal service, and restores public confidence in the tire recycling system. Ask yourselves this before you move forward :

Can the Ontario Ministry be liable if they knowingly allow anti‑competitive behaviour to continue?
Yes — under Canadian administrative law, competition law principles, and the Ministry’s statutory duties, the Ministry can face legal exposure if it knowingly permits a structurally anti‑competitive system to continue without intervention.

Thank You for your time