Public Comment on Bill 4,…

Public Comment on Bill 4, the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018

October 11, 2018

ABSTRACT
This comment addresses Bill 4, the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018 (Bill 4), currently awaiting second reading in the provincial house. If passed, Bill 4 will repeal the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016 (CCMLEA). The authors oppose Bill 4 and urge that the CCMLEA should not be repealed without new emissions pricing legislation in place. Further, the authors recommend that any modifications to Ontario’s emissions pricing regime should strengthen existing legislation designed to reduce carbon emissions in Ontario and assist the provincial economy in moving towards carbon neutrality.

The comment begins with an introduction on the climate change issues Canada now faces and Ontario’s need to play its part in reducing the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs). It then provides an overview of the reasons to retain the existing CCMLEA before recommending ways the current pricing system could be improved through alternative or supplementary measures.

A. INTRODUCTION- CANADA AND THE GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: ONTARIO MUST DO ITS PART

Over the past century, Canadians have relied on environmental resources to provide enormous economic development. Canada is home to the world’s third largest oil reserves, and a considerable amount of energy is necessary to develop the oil industry; this is contributing greatly to Canada’s total GHG emissions.1 Climate change threatens the existence of the natural resources upon which Canada’s economy is based: reducing environmental impact through reducing our greenhouse gas emissions is the most significant way we can protect our natural resources and stabilise our economy. Canada is a participant in numerous international environmental conventions, such as the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement, but has consistently failed to meet its GHG emission reduction targets. Collective action is needed to achieve effective policies that can tackle climate change, and fulfill Canada’s obligations to the international community and to future generations.2

The current Government of Ontario is considerably motivated by economic growth, as well as reducing taxes to help ease economic strain on Ontarians, and while this is a commendable undertaking, one that many Ontarians welcome, repealing environmental policies is dangerous and short sighted and will ultimately increase costs to taxpayers and the Ontario government. While the government of Ontario has only considered climate change in its legislation and regulation over the last few years, companies such as Exxon and Imperial Oil have taken climate change into their planning considerations for decades.3 Fossil fuel companies have recognised the potential impacts of climate change on their business operations: the Government of Ontario owes a duty to its citizens to undertake at least the same level of care and planning in its public policy and operations.

Additionally, Indigenous voices have long been excluded from the province’s decision-making, which has contributed to ongoing environmental derogation as Indigenous Ontarians’ experiences, environmental concerns, and world views were ignored.4 Currently, Ontario and the Federal government is working towards repairing relationships with Indigenous communities as a part of the ongoing project of Reconciliation, which includes their participation in public policy decisions, especially pertaining to the environment.5 Repealing the existing cap and trade program in Ontario without a sufficient replacement, is reminiscent of the past injustices towards Indigenous communities and fails to uphold the current standards of Reconciliation.

Ontario must address the dangers posed by climate change. The province is the second largest producer of GHG emissions after Alberta in our total output of GHG emissions;6 meanwhile, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, the predominant GHG, now exceed 410 parts million, “the highest in 800,000 years.”7 As Ontario winters become more mild, increased rainfall and snow runoff will lead to greater risk of flooding in the Great Lakes Basin.8 With hotter summers, forest fires will become a seasonal occurrence carrying with them even greater consequences for flooding.9 Strong intervention is needed to ensure that Ontarians are doing what is necessary to safeguard the right to a healthy environment for future generations. Without such intervention, continued GHG emissions will radically disrupt Ontario’s natural ecosystem and endanger the lives of human and non-human entities.10 The Progressive Conservative government has indicated that the repeal of the CCMLEA will result in savings of $260 per year for Ontario families,11 but if we maintain our current trajectory the costs associated with natural disasters from erratic weather patterns due to climate change, as well as the health care costs to treat pollution-related illness, will cost Ontarians far more. The 2013 Toronto floods, for example, cost $940 million in insured damage, the most in Ontario history.12 In 2017, flooding in Windsor Ontario cost over $124 million in insured damage. Insurance companies have raised premiums by as much as 20% and the Insurance Bureau of Canada estimates that 10% of Canadian properties may soon be too high a risk to be insured by the private sector.13 Costs associated with increased public health issues, higher resilience of pests, and more volatile growing seasons for example, will further add to the cost that Ontarians have to bear.

We urge the Ontario government to consider the scientific evidence presented most recently by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC reiterated the wide-reaching and detrimental impacts of climate change on the entire human population. More importantly, the IPCC unequivocally stated that if current greenhouse gas emission rates continue, by 2030, the effects of climate change will be assured, augmented, and near unalterable.14 The IPCC further recommends carbon pricing as a key component of any system that seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and halt the march of climate change. Specifically, the IPCC states that “a policy mix encompassing a moderate carbon price combined with a ban on new coal-based power plants and dedicated policies addressing renewable electricity generation capacity and electric vehicles,” and a “mix of stringent energy efficiency policies combined with a carbon tax” are among the most effective options to tackle climate change mitigation.15

B. WITH THE CCMLEA ONTARIO WAS HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

i. The Polluter Pays Principle, and the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Account
The CCMLEA represents an important climate change initiative. It created powerful incentives to curb GHG emissions. After closing coal fired plants and joining the Western Climate Initiative’s Cap and Trade market, Ontario’s GHG emissions were trending downward, with 2016 seeing the lowest emission rate since reporting began in 1990, while, population and economic growth trended upward.16 Passage of Bill 4 will mean that Ontario will change course and fall behind in its commitment to the rest of Canada and to the global community.

In 2017 Ontario’s Cap and Trade revenues were $1.9 billion, while Ontario companies spent up to $2.8 billion on emissions permits from the provincial government. These funds were to be held in the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Account (the Account) and used on initiatives to reduce GHG emissions and develop the infrastructure needed for a low-carbon, and eventually carbon-neutral, economy. This reflects the principle that the transition to carbon neutrality should be paid for by the corporations and bodies who are the largest contributors to climate change.17 The Account provides an opportunity for the government to invest in new low-carbon projects that create jobs, attract international investment and cooperation, and that drive economic growth; there are currently 50 green initiatives and over 500 organizations funded in this way.18 Moreover, the Account makes money directly available to taxpayers in the form of rebates through the Green Energy Fund: prior to its cancellation, over 140,000 Ontarians had made use of this Fund, saving money on energy efficient home upgrades, among other things.19 Further, the section 71(7) of the CCMLEA Section 71(7) provided full and transparent disclosure of monies that the government received from corporations participating in the climate market. This section also required the government to produce an annual reporting accounting for the expenditure of all revenue gathered under this Act. This ensured that Ontario residents and taxpayers could see the direct benefits of the Act and were given the tools to decide whether to support climate change mitigation initiatives.

In short, the Account demonstrated that taking money out of carbon-producing corporations’ pockets and putting it back into the provincial economy can stimulate economic growth and provide other benefits for the people of Ontario; it is a critical element of any climate change mitigation policy that must remain in place to facilitate the transition to a low-carbon economy.

ii. Repeal of the CCMLEA would be wasteful and create unnecessary uncertainty
Ontario has long been committed to an emissions trading approach to carbon pricing. The province joined the Western Climate Initiative in 2008 and began extensive consultation with stakeholders in 2015, before introducing the CCMLEA in 2016.20 A waste-averse government should look to improving, rather than replacing, Ontario’s existing policy on climate change because abandoning our current system would mean wasting the government resources that went into developing the current regime, as well as the efforts of the many Ontarians that collaborated with the government in good faith in devising the system. And, in keeping with the government’s obligations under Part II of Ontario’s Environmental Bill of Rights, modification and development of climate policy will necessarily involve extensive public participation.21 Additionally, providing opportunity for public participation from indigenous groups at the legislative stage will assist the government in satisfying its obligations to consult with those groups with respect to executive action, as required by s35 of the Charter, and, more broadly, under relevant international law.22

In addition to unnecessarily wasting past government expenditures, Bill 4 will be disruptive to Ontario’s economic stability. As members of the Ecofiscal Commission recently noted, the uncertainty on carbon pricing policies that Bill 4 creates “adds costs to businesses by complicating their planning.… the reversal of the system – especially if compensation is uncertain – also undermines trust in government, making investment in the province less appealing.”23 Compounding this uncertainty and creating further government waste, the province has decided to join Saskatchewan in a legal challenge to the federal carbon pricing requirements under the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change.24 As legal scholars have indicated, this challenge is unlikely to be successful and is a waste of Ontario taxpayers’ money;25 the province should follow Manitoba’s lead and abandon the challenge.26

RECOMMENDATION #1: Ontario should not pass Bill 4. The province should not repeal the CCMLEA unless substitute legislation is in place. Any replacement should an emissions pricing system be at least as stringent as the CCMLEA.

RECOMMENDATION #2: Any replacement or modification to Ontario’s carbon pricing system should include an equivalent to the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Account to fund green initiatives and infrastructure; the administration of this Account should be guided by the principles of transparency enacted by the CCMLEA.

C. IMPLEMENTING A STRONGER CAP AND TRADE REGIME

i. Consultation, certainty and the need for public assessment
As indicated above, the government of Ontario is required to engage in meaningful public consultation on environmental policy under Part II of Ontario’s Environmental Bill of Rights.27 Consultation, however, represents only part of the government’s obligation to ensure that information about action on climate change is properly communicated to the public, the business community, and local government.

In the context of an emissions trading system, targets regarding emissions reductions and the details of year-over-year emissions caps need to be determined and announced far in advance. The initial introduction of the emissions system lacked clarity regarding the implementation of caps, which may have led to confusion among emitters, slowed the purchase of emission credits at initial auctions, and impaired the predictability required for a stable transition to a low carbon economy.28 In 2017 the government announced yearly caps to 2030, increasing predictability for emitters, but the precise number of emissions credits to be auctioned was announced only until 2020, providing a short window for business planning.29 This degree of uncertainty is perhaps negligible in comparison to the radical departure that cancellation of the cap and trade scheme represents for our economy, but the fact remains that predictability is essential to effective regulation to address climate change; this requires transparency and effective diffusion of information on climate action policy.

Ontario should adopt the UK practice of establishing legally binding 5-year emissions caps 12 years in advance of implementation, as the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario (ECO) has long advocated.30 Under this system, a panel of independent experts makes recommendations on emissions budgets and these are subject to adoption by the government. The fact that these experts are non-partisan, as well as the long lead time provided by the system, encourages the political acceptability of adequate emissions caps.31

Adoption of such a system in Ontario should also mandate a periodic, independent climate change risk assessment report, as required by UK law.32 Research indicates that the development of these reports provides a site for collaboration among government actors from different levels and jurisdictions, businesses, non-governmental agencies and other local groups differentially impacted by climate change.33 Although the potential for such collaboration may have yet to be fully realized in the UK,34 the risk assessment development framework would provide ongoing consultation between government and stakeholders. This would allow for the implementation of responsive climate change policy by government and greater appreciation of the need for such policy among businesses, local governments, and consumers; it would also allow stakeholders to more effectively plan and adapt over the near and long term.

In Ontario there is clearly a need for greater publicization of climate change risk among consumers and better understanding of how mitigation efforts necessarily impact prices – most obviously and fundamentally, that of fossil fuels. The polluter pays principle, which is essential to effective action on climate change in a market economy, extends to consumers: as the ECO has pointed out, the carbon pricing system adopted by the Ontario government “is intended to increase the cost of fossil fuels, so that people and organizations have an economic incentive to use less.”35 While increased fuel prices generally lead to reduced consumption,36 there is some evidence from British Columbia’s experience with carbon taxation that publicization of increasing fuel costs in the context of climate change mitigation projects may have a more dramatic impact on fuel consumption.37 Ontario’s cap and trade system encourages unpredictable fluctuations in fuel prices, however, and the connection between the carbon pricing scheme and increased costs may be less apparent to consumers. A robust risk assessment and mitigation model may produce greater awareness and tolerance of higher fuel prices among Ontario consumers, although this may be usefully supplemented with a more direct carbon pricing and rebate scheme such as that adopted in BC (discussed in greater detail below, see section D. Supplementary and alternative approaches to emissions pricing).

ii. A sectoral approach to cap and trade and greater transparency on allowances and offsets
As indicated above, Ontario should either work to improve the established cap and trade system or repeal it only when a new and more robust system is in place. In either case, if Ontario maintains a market-based emissions trading system, it should adopt a sectoral approach and categorize emitters according to their role in the economy, the amount of emissions they produce, as well as their function in, and ability to transition towards, a carbon neutral economy. A simplified sectoral categorization scheme, such as that recently advocated by Dalhousie law professor Meinhard Doelle, would provide a realistic assessment of the future of emitters in Ontario’s economy and make free allowances and offsets available only where they will meaningfully contribute to a smoother transition to carbon neutrality and counteract the province-wide effort of reducing emissions as little as possible.38

Despite early calls for a restrictive approach to free allowances and exemptions,39 the Ontario government provided a large number of free allowances to heavy emitters during the 2017-2020 period in order to reduce the incentive of relocating polluting activities to unregulated jurisdictions (referred to as “carbon leakage”).40 Further, by linking Ontario’s emissions market with those of California and Quebec, the cap and trade system would have allowed emitters to purchase allowances at a reduced rate, because California’s cap is so large, encourage capital outflow from Ontario and generally reducing the efficacy of the scheme for reducing greenhouse gases.41 Moreover, the ability of polluters in Ontario to purchase carbon offsets in other jurisdictions, such as California, means that the provincial government is unable to regulate the quality of those offsets to ensure they actually mitigated emissions in Ontario and, of course, offsets outside the jurisdiction, while arguably contributing to a global reduction in emissions, do nothing to reduce the local impact of air pollution.

Doelle’s approach involves an assessment of how the carbon pricing scheme will impact a given economic sector (mining, agriculture, manufacturing and so on). Doelle encourages policy makers to consider how much of the increased cost in a given sector will be passed along to consumers, for example, and to what extent emissions reductions are feasible and subject to incentivization. Given the ultimate aim of carbon neutrality, we should consider if protection from the economic impact of the scheme is desirable in the short, medium or long term.42 With this these questions in mind, Doelle suggests, we might categorize sectors into three groups: those that are important today but will not be part of a carbon neutral economy, such as the oil and gas industries; those that will be continue to be important but will need to undergo significant modification, such as forestry, transportation and mining; and those that will be essential to carbon neutrality, such as renewable energy and sustainable agriculture. This categorization, Doelle argues, should guide the allocation of free allowances and the availability of offsets.43

Adopting this sectoral approach in Ontario would enhance the transparency and accountability of the cap and trade system. It would require the government to make a clear assessment of the role an industry will play in the province’s economic future and regulate its exposure to the carbon market accordingly. The comparative simplicity of the approach, moreover, will make it easy for stakeholders to assess whether an industry – or an individual emitter – is being treated fairly and appropriately in the context of the transition to carbon neutrality and our global responsibilities with respect to climate change.

RECOMMENDATION #3: Enact a legal requirement that Ontario emissions cap be announced 12 years in advance; create an independent commission to provide recommendations on the emissions cap and to produce a periodic climate change risk assessment report in collaboration with stakeholders in order to raise awareness about climate change mitigation and adaptation.

RECOMMENDATION #4: Consider a sectoral approach to cap and trade and adopt a transparent, restrictive approach to the allocation of free allowances and offsets to Ontario emitters.

D. SUPPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EMISSIONS PRICING

While we strongly advocate for future climate change mitigation systems that build on the success of the CCMLEA, there may be supplementary or alternative means to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to facilitate the transition to a low-carbon economy.

i. Provincial investment: sector- and population-specific legislation
The province and its municipalities are some of the largest employers, purchasers, and users of services in in the province. The province and its municipalities employ over 1.4 million Ontario residents.44 The province and its associated sub-national governments, in providing services to Ontario’s 13 million residents: use vehicles and gasoline, purchase products, and invest monies. Legislation that requires the province to procure materials that have a low carbon footprint can help support the growth and development of the low-carbon economy. Further, the province and municipalities owe a duty to their citizens to invest in initiatives that are more stable and secure than high-carbon industries. Future climate change mitigation policy initiatives (both national and international) could mean that high-carbon industries (such as forestry and gasoline vehicle production) will no longer have a market for their products and will be more likely to collapse.45 The collapse of these industries could result in massive job losses for Ontarians, with no alternative low-carbon industry growing and developing to cushion that fall.

As previously discussed, a sector specific approach may be appropriate for Ontario’s cap and trade system, but targeted supplementary legislation is required for high-emission industries. The primary contributors to Ontario’s economy are typically high carbon-producing sectors. The CCMLEA does not outline sector-specific initiatives that can help transition industries from high-carbon to low-carbon. For example, providing specific targets and programs for the automotive manufacturing industry can provide a framework for the industry to scale back production of gasoline vehicles, and increase production of electric vehicles. This may involve worker re-training programs, funding for alternate energy vehicle research, and assistance in developing the manufacturing infrastructure and maintenance infrastructure (e.g. charging stations) for electric vehicles.

Additionally, any emissions policy must recognise that climate change and financially-oriented mitigation strategies have more severe impacts on populations that are already vulnerable.46 A percentage of the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Account must be allocated to initiatives that benefit these communities, contributing to equality. This structure has been successful in California in contributing to economic growth, GHG emissions reductions, and equality.47

ii. Implementing a supplementary or alternative emissions tax
While the CCMLEA established a cap and trade regime in Ontario, the province may wish to implement a more straightforward CO2-equivalent emissions tax as a supplement or alternative to the current system. British Columbia’s experience with carbon taxation, widely regarded as a success, suggests that it may be an effective means of reducing emissions; the system is widely regarded as a success, though there are indications that tax will have to be increased significantly in order to continue driving down emissions.48

BC’s tax, which covers 77 per cent of fossil fuel emitters in BC’s economy, was initially imposed at a rate $10 of per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions and increased at a rate of $5 per year until it reached $30 in 2012, where it plateaued; starting April 1, 2018, the rate increased to $35 and is set to increase annually to $50 in 2021.49 Five years after the introduction of the tax, BC had seen a 16 percent decline in per capita consumption of fossil fuels in the province, compared to a 3 percent increase in the rest of Canada; the BC government estimates that the province’s net emissions have declined nearly 5 percent as of 2015, though some studies suggest a decline of as much as 9 percent.50 Until very recently the tax has been revenue neutral and studies suggest that it has had little or no impact on the growth of BC’s economy.51

If Ontario does not implement a carbon pricing system it will be subject to a federally imposed carbon tax on fossil fuels starting at $20 per emissions ton starting January 1, 2019, and rising to $50 per ton in 2022; large emitters will be subject to a separate, output based pricing system.52 Leaving carbon pricing to the federal government is inadvisable because the federal plan provides excessive exemptions in many highly polluting industrial sectors and is not comprehensive or stringent enough to achieve our emissions reductions targets under the Paris Agreement.53 Moreover, failure to implement a carbon price would mean the Ontario government would lose its ability to re-direct the funds generated by the tax; it would also represent an abdication of responsibility in a crucial policy area.54

Emissions trading has been endorsed by the global community and is generally recognized as a viable means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.55 Such systems are not without their critics, however, and there may be good reasons to consider implementing a more straightforward taxation system.56 One major and often overlooked shortcoming of cap and trade is that it may disincentivize net emissions reductions below the level of the cap and reduce the efficacy of supplemental policies designed to reduce pollution. For example, introduction of an emissions standard in a cap and trade system may not actually reduce overall emissions because firms can engage in the polluting activity at a greater rate and still remain within their cap. Carbon taxation, meanwhile, may enhance the effect of supplemental policies because the rate of emission will always be associated with an increasingly stringent cost, provided the tax is implemented as broadly as possible.57 As previously discussed, linking our emissions market with jurisdictions with generous caps and poorly regulated offsets may also reduce the efficacy of a cap and trade scheme.

Conversely, Ontario’s experience with cap and trade indicates that it can generate a large amount of revenue for green initiatives.58 If carbon taxation is revenue neutral, as has previously been the case in BC, it will not have this effect. However, redistribution of carbon taxation can reduce some of the regressive features of carbon pricing and, of course, carbon taxation need not be revenue neutral. However, given that the political feasibility of carbon taxation may be contingent upon revenue neutrality, Ontario should consider imposing a direct carbon tax and returning all revenues through progressive rebates designed to insure that those most impacted by increased prices – low-income Ontarians and those living in remote areas – receive sufficient relief. Such a tax could be coupled with a more modest cap and trade system to generate revenues for green initiatives; as previously described, this should be based on the sectoral approach with only restricted offset and allowance trading with other jurisdictions.

RECOMMENDATION #5: Adopt supplemental legislation to assist local communities, vulnerable populations and high emissions industries adapt to climate change, mitigation policies and to low-carbon/carbon-neutral economy.

RECOMMENDATION #6: Consider implementing an emissions tax, either as a supplement or an alternative to a cap and trade system; regardless of whether or not the tax is revenue neutral it should provide rebates to members of vulnerable populations.

SOURCES / CITATIONS:
1 Debora VanNijnatten, Canadian Environmental Policy and Politics: The Challenges of Austerity and Ambivalence (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2015) at xiii.
2 Ibid at 221; as a signatory to the Paris Agreement, Canada is committed to working towards keeping global temperatures at less than 2-degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, see Justine Sullivan, “Paris Climate Agreement 101: No Jargon, Just Facts”, (7 April 2016), online: unfoundation.org <https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/paris-climate-agreement-101-no-jargo…;.
3 Sara Jerving et al, “What Exxon knew about the Earth’s melting Arctic”, Los Angeles Times (9 October 2015), online: <http://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/&gt;.
4 VanNijnatten, supra note 1 at 163.
5 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, ed, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015) at 379; VanNijnatten, supra note 1 at 163.
6 Environment and Climate Change, National Inventory Report 1990-2016 - Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks in Canada: Executive Summary (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada, 2018) at 13.
7 Doyle Rice, “Earth’s carbon dioxide levels reach highest point in 800,000 years”, Toronto Star (5 May 2018), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/05/05/earths-carbon-dioxide-lev…;.
8 Kevin Bunch, “Climate Projections Suggest More Winter Rains, Threatening More Flooding”, (5 April 2018), online: Great Lakes Connection <http://ijc.org/greatlakesconnection/en/2018/04/climate-projections-sugg…;.
9 Gabriele Roy, “As forest fires burn in Ontario, experts warn of long-term environmental impact”, The Globe and Mail (6 August 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-as-forest-fires-burn-in-…;.
10 VanNijnatten, supra note 1 at 222.
11 Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks, “Ontario Introduces Legislation to End Cap and Trade Carbon Tax Era in Ontario”, online: news.ontario.ca <https://news.ontario.ca/ene/en/2018/07/ontario-introduces-legislation-t…;.
12 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Climate Action in Ontario, What’s Next?: 2018 Greenhouse Gas Progress Report (Toronto, 2018) at 29.
13 Ibid at 30.
14 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5 °C, SR15 (Geneva, 2018) at SPM-4.
15 Ibid at 2–81.
16 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 12 at 9.
17 Richard Heede, “Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010” (2014) 122:1–2 Climatic Change 229.
18 “Report: The $2 Billion Question - How Can Ontario Reinvest Cap-and-Trade Proceeds to Meet its Climate Challenge and Grow the Economy?”, online: Environmental Defence <https://environmentaldefence.ca/reports-guides/report-the-2-billion-que…;; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 12 at 72.
19 CTV News, “Province scraps Green Ontario Fund”, (19 June 2018), online: <https://ottawa.ctvnews.ca/province-scraps-green-ontario-fund-1.3980209&…;.
20 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Introduction to Cap and Trade in Ontario: Appendix A to the ECO’s Greenhouse Gas Progress Report 2016 (Toronto, 2016) at 8.
21 Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993, SO 1993, c 28 [Environmental Bill of Rights].
22 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter], s 35; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 October 2007, 61/295 [UNDRIP], Article 19.
23 Dale Beugin et al, “If not carbon pricing in Ontario – which works well – then what, Mr. Ford?”, The Globe and Mail (21 June 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-if-not-carb…;.
24 Canada, Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change: Canada’s Plan to Address Climate Change and Grow the Economy. (Ottawa, 2016); the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act is enacted under part 5 of the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1, SC 2018, c 12.
25 Nathalie J Chalifour, “Saskatchewan, Ontario and the constitutionality of a national carbon price”, The Globe and Mail (27 September 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-saskatchewan-ontario-an…;; Nathalie J Chalifour, “Climate Federalism - Parliament’s Ample Constitutional Authority to Regulate GHG Emissions” (2016) 36 Nat’l J Const L 331; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 12 at 127.
26 Laura Kane, “Federal threat to impose higher carbon tax on Manitoba ‘misguided’: minister”, National Post (4 November 2017), online: <https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/federal-threat-to…;.
27 Environmental Bill of Rights, supra note 21.
28 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Facing Climate Change: Greenhouse Gas Progress Report 2016 (Toronto, 2016) at 75–76; general emissions reduction targets, rather than detailed yearly emissions caps, are identified in the government’s five year plan for the emissions trading system: Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, Ontario’s Five Year Climate Change Action Plan 2016–2020 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2016) at 13–15; for a discussion on the need for predictability in conjunction with a stringent cap, see Dale Beugin et al, The Way Forward for Ontario: Design Principles for Ontario’s New Cap-and-Trade System (Montreal: Ecofiscal Commission, 2015) at 3–5.
29 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Ontario’s Climate Act From Plan to Progress: Annual Greenhouse Gas Progress Report 2017 (Toronto, 2017) at 7, 49.
30 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 28 at 76; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 12 at 98–99.
31 In addition to carbon budgets, the Committee produces detailed reports and advisory guidelines on climate policy, as well as national Climate Change Risk Assessments (discussed below), all of which are publically accessible, see “About the Committee on Climate Change”, online: Committee on Climate Change <https://www.theccc.org.uk/about/&gt;.
32 The most recent UK assessment is available on line: “UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017”, online: GOVUK <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-climate-change-risk-asses…;; the ECO describes the assessment program, but does not specifically recommend its adoption in Ontario, supra note 12 at 102–103.
33 C Howarth et al, “Co-producing UK climate change adaptation policy: An analysis of the 2012 and 2017 UK Climate Change Risk Assessments” (2018) 89 Environmental Science & Policy 412; Kathryn Brown et al, “Turning risk assessment and adaptation policy priorities into meaningful interventions and governance processes” (2018) 376:2121 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A.
34 Howarth et al, supra note 33 at 418–419.
35 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 28 at 77; for a discussion of the polluter pays principle in the current Ontario context, see Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 12 at 121–130.
36 For the example of Ontario gasoline price and consumption see figure 1.24 in Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 12 at 43.
37 See Thomas F Pedersen & Stewart Elgie, “A Template for the World: British Columbia’s Carbon Tax Shift” in Larry Kreiser et al, eds, Carbon Pricing: Design, Experiences and Issues (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) at 11–12; as well as the discussion in Nicholas Rivers & Brandon Schaufele, Salience of Carbon Taxes in the Gasoline Market, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2131468 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2014) at 19–21.
38 Meinhard Doelle, Toward a Principled Design of Provincial Cap & Trade Systems: Lessons from Nova Scotia’s Proposal to Meet the Carbon Pricing Requirement in the Pan-Canadian Framework for Climate Change, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3006264 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2017).
39 See, for example, Beugin et al, supra note 28 at 6–8.
40 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 28 at 67–68.
41 Critics have recently warned that California’s cap is too high and, because credits do not expire, “[i]ndustries could buy and hoard so many allowances to emit greenhouse gases now that they might not need to actually reduce emissions in the future, when the state’s emission target becomes especially stringent.” See Michael Hiltzik, “No longer termed a ‘failure,’ California’s cap-and-trade program faces a new critique: Is it too successful?”, Los Angeles Times (12 January 2018), online: <http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-captrade-20180111…;.
42 Doelle, supra note 38 at 12.
43 Ibid at 12–13.
44 Statistics Canada, “Archived - Public sector employment, wages and salaries, seasonally unadjusted and adjusted”, (19 December 2017), online: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1010002501&gt;.
45 Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, “Implementing the Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures” (2017) at 17 n10.
46 Working Group II of the IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001), ch 18.5.1.
47 Supra note 9.
48 Eduardo Porter, “Does a Carbon Tax Work? Ask British Columbia”, The New York Times (21 December 2017), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/business/does-a-carbon-tax-work-ask-…;; Brian Murray & Nicholas Rivers, “British Columbia’s revenue-neutral carbon tax: A review of the latest ‘grand experiment’ in environmental policy” (2015) 86:Complete Energy Policy 674; Stewart Elgie & Jessica McClay, “BC’s Carbon Tax Shift Is Working Well after Four Years (Attention Ottawa)” (2013) 39 Can Pub Pol’y, online: <https://doi.org/10.3138/CPP.39.Supplement2.S1&gt;; Pedersen & Elgie, supra note 37; recent data suggests that emissions are now on the rise in BC, despite earlier reductions, see Judith Lavoie, “B.C. Quietly Releases Emissions Update That Shows It’ll Blow 2020 Climate Target”, (12 January 2018), online: The Narwhal <https://thenarwhal.ca/b-c-quietly-releases-emissions-update-shows-it-ll…;.
49 Government of British Columbia, “British Columbia’s Carbon Tax”, online: <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/climate-change/planning-…;.
50 Elgie & McClay, supra note 48 at 7; Government of British Columbia, supra note 49; Murray & Rivers, supra note 48 at 678.
51 For a review of these studies, see Murray & Rivers, supra note 48 at 678–680; previously all carbon tax revenue was returned to BC consumers and businesses through tax cuts, starting April 1, 2018 some revenue is being diverted to fund green initiatives Government of British Columbia, supra note 49.
52 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 12 at 91, 123.
53 Meinhard Doelle, Decades of Climate Policy Failure in Canada: Can We Break the Vicious Cycle?, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3228743 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2018) at 3–4.
54 Non-participation in the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change will mean that funds collected by the federal government through a carbon tax will be returned directly to Ontarians, rather than being directed to the provincial government, see Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 12 at 126–127; there is some indication that this would lead to a positive net revenue for Ontarians, see Jesse Ferreras, “Carbon pricing will cost Canadians money — it might also give them back plenty more: report"”, (22 September 2018), online: Global News <https://globalnews.ca/news/4476897/mark-cameron-carbon-pricing-report/&…;.
55 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, at Article 11; David M Driesen, “Emissions Trading Versus Pollution Taxes: Playing ‘Nice’ with Other Instruments” (2018) 48:29 Envtl L 29.
56 For an analysis of the various criticisms of emissions trading see Simon Caney & Cameron Hepburn, “Carbon Trading: Unethical, Unjust and Ineffective?” (2011) 69 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 201.
57 Lawrence H Goulder & Andrew Schein, Carbon Taxes vs. Cap and Trade: A Critical Review, Working Paper 19338 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013) at 19–20; Driesen, supra note 55.
58 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 12 at 62.

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