• Making the Code a policy…

• Making the Code a policy incorporated by reference in the Regulation, rather than a schedule to the Regulation;
This will allow the government to side step Indigenous consultation which is enshrined in the constitution; the government will easily change the “Code Policy” without consultation. This is not reconciliation. They will also be able to weaken the Code as changing policy is much easier then changing regulations. This will lead to tax payers paying for corporation that make billions, as rehabilitation will be minimized.

• Allow certain time-consuming studies to be delivered after the commencement of mine development, instead of requiring that such studies be completed and included in a closure plan before development starts.
This will create gaps, mine closure is linked, you cannot determine or predict rehabilitation without these studies, which means that there mining companies will not be providing the required money to rehab mine sites. How can you provide money upfront if you don’t even know what is going on, example would be water treatment. This leaves the risks to the tax payer, who will pick up the tab on rehabilitation. These studies also determine if projects are feasible and profitable, do investors really want to invest in a project with uncertainty.

• Qualified person;
The definition of a “Qualified person” is not stringent enough. How will certifications be audited, what checks, and balances will the ministry implement? Are we just to trust the mining companies blindly? What will be the consequences for false statement or false certifications?

Minister powers
Is it appropriate for the Minister (politician)to be making decisions on whether a mine or drilling program should take place? Is it appropriate for the Minister to be making decision on what should or shouldn’t be deferred, what professional certification does the Minister possess which makes him qualified to make these decision on what will or will not have an effect. Are mining companies and exploration companies contributing to the Minister’s campaign? It seems like a direct conflict of interest. When a politician is advocating for industry and at the same time has taken over the role of a regulator and public servant when he empowers himself as the decision maker removing the Director from that role and assigning it to himself. How would the Minister comply with ONTARIO REGULATION 381/07? Is it even possible when the checks and balance that comes with a non-elected senior public servant being a regulatory decision maker is eliminated and both the political and public servant role is played by the same person?